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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the current reform of pension system in Russia. 
A number of serious drawbacks in pension provision call for introduction of a 
multipillar system. The superior performance of the multipillar system roots in the funded 
pillar. In contrast with PAYG pension scheme, the funded one has several important 
advantages. Among them are the ability to eliminate the distortion of individual labor supply 
and saving decision; and an accumulation of money available for a long-run domestic 
investment. Besides, the implementation of the funded pillar increases tax compliance. The 
last result is proved in the paper. This effect of the reform is of particular importance for 
Russia, where tax evasion is widespread.  
The aim of the paper is to explain why, instead of the necessity of the reform and a 
superior performance of the funded system, we experience quite moderate size of the reform 
and a slow progress in the transformation to the multipillar pension system.  
The main arguments are the following. The scale of the reform is determined by the 
government. The reform is costly. It demands a new law provision and an informational 
database to be created. There are current pensioners who have to be provided. At the same 
time, part of the contribution has to be withdrawn from the current pension provision and 
invested – according to the basic principle of the funded system. Thus the costs are high 
while the sources for financing are limited in Russia. Further increase of the social tax rate is 
impossible because of the negative effect on tax compliance. An external debt is not possible 
\ too costly because of the former borrowings. An internal borrowing is limited by the low 
trust of the population. In these conditions the self-financing ability of the reform becomes 
especially important: i.e. the reform increases tax compliance and the government uses this 
surplus for the financing of the transformation of the pension system and pension provision.  
Since the result of the reform is determined by the interaction between the 
government and individuals, I use 2-stage sequential game to analyze the outcome of the 
reform. On the first stage the government determines the size of the funded pillar in the new 
multipillar pension system. On the second stage individuals respond on it by setting the part 
of the income they reveal. It is assumed that the government can estimate the individual 
response on the first stage.  
It is shown that the outcome of the game is not Pareto-efficient, i.e. the scale of the 
reform and the increase in tax compliance are smaller than possible. Among the reasons that 
led to the inefficiency the major ones are the following. First, it is an inability of the 
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government to elicit higher compliance by other means than the very reconstruction. Even 
some punishment doesn’t eliminate the inefficiency. The second reason is a self-financing of 
the pension reform and a lack of other sources. Third, the costs of the reform are increasing 
with the scale. Gradually it makes the corresponding increase in the tax compliance 
insufficient to cover the costs. The forth reason is self-interests of the government, which 
cares about retaining the power and electoral support. Hence, it puts higher weight on 
current costs of the reform than on its long-run gain.  
As long as the highlighted conditions exist and supplement each other the attempts to 
accelerate reform are unlikely to be successful. 
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Summary 
The aim of the paper is to explain why, instead of the necessity of the 
pension reform and a superior performance of the funded system, Russia 
experiences quite moderate size of the reform and a slow progress in the 
transformation to the multipillar pension system.  
There are several advantages of the Funded system in comparison 
with PAYG that made it very attractive in the present conditions of ageing of 
the population. They are a higher return on the contributions, a more active 
capital market, an increase in savings and investment (although there is a 
lot of discussion about it). 
The flaws in the design of Russian pension system inherited from the 
USSR worsen the performance of pension provision especially in the 
difficult transition period. 
The reform was urgent since Russian pension system faces a very 
serious solvency problem. A demographic crisis, a weak compliance and tax 
evasion reduce contribution inflow, while loose eligibility rights and a lot of 
privilege beneficiaries increase the outflow.  
It was decided to introduce a multipillar system. The introduction of 
the funded pillar was stipulated by the following advantages: a closer 
perceived link between contributions and benefits, a higher return on 
contributions and an undistorted individual labour supply. 
It is proved in the paper that the reconstruction contributes to the 
increase in tax compliance and restores the solvency of pension system. It 
is especially important in the conditions of the scarcity of other sources of 
financing of the reform (e.g. a state debt, a reduction of the benefits, or an 
increase of the social tax rate).  
However, as long as the scale of the reform is determined through the 
interaction between the self-interest elective government and individuals, 
the outcome of the reform is not Pareto-efficient. In the paper the 
interaction is analysed by means of Stackelberg game. The inefficiency of 
the outcome means that the scale of the reform (or, alternatively, the size of 
the funded pillar) and the revealed part are not as high as they could be. 
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Thus the reform doesn’t reach one of its main goals – the increase in tax 
compliance. It seriously undermines the ability of the new pension system 
to give sufficient provision to the elderly. There are several conditions in 
Russia which stipulate the inefficient outcome: 
1. The surplus of revealed part of income caused by the reform is a main 
source for financing of the reconstruction of the pension system. 
External sources are limited by the debt-burden budget. An increase of 
the social tax rates is limited by their high level and its negative effect on 
the tax compliance. A contraction of eligibility rules as a source has been 
already exhausted. A further reduction of the benefits is not possible 
because of their low level.  
2. Because of the necessary institutional and economical arrangements 
and the obligation to provide current pensioners the costs of the 
reconstruction are increasing with the scale of the reform. Gradually, the 
corresponding surplus becomes insufficient to cover the costs.  
3. The scale of the reform is determined by an elective government. 
Because of the self-interests to retain the power, the government puts 
higher weight on current costs of transition than on the long-run gains 
of the reform. The possible reason can be an inability of the government 
to persuade citizens to tighten the living conditions today for the better 
pension provision in the future. The situation is peculiar for Russia, 
where there is a lack of trust of the population to such kind of promises. 
4. The government has no other tools (in addition to the very introduction 
of the funded pillar) to elicit an increase in the compliance, i.e. tools to 
constraint utility level of agent. The change in power structure in favour 
of the government can eliminate Pareto-inefficiency. It is worth to note 
that such a change in power structure can be unfavourable for 
individuals. Because if the government can fix/constraint their utility 
levels, it may have a power to reduce the utility further down and made 
individuals worse off. So even though the outcome is Pareto-inefficient it 
can be more favourable for individuals to have some inefficiency with the 
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freedom, rather than to be squeezed by the self-interest government in 
the Pareto-efficient way. 
As long as the highlighted conditions exist and supplement each 
other the attempts to accelerate reform are unlikely to be successful. This 
result corresponds to the way the current pension reform in Russia goes. 
The reform has a moderate scale and causes just a slight reduction in tax 
evasion. 
The paper considers such instruments as a stricter punishment for 
tax evasion or a more even distribution of the social tax among employees 
and employers. These instruments reduce the tax evasion and increase the 
scale of reform. But still, they do not eliminate Pareto-inefficiency.  
The paper is structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 describes the origin of the problem. It emphasises the 
circumstances that made the reform of Russian pension system urgent. 
Chapter 2 analyses the path of the reform by means of the game-
theory approach. The special attention is devoted to the reasons of the 
moderate size and slow progress of the reconstruction.  
Chapter 3 introduces additional policy instruments: a punishment for 
the tax evasion and a more even distribution of the social tax rate between 
an employer and employees. Afterwards I take a look on the current reforms 
launched in the end of 2001.  
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Introduction 
Recently there is a wide discussion all over the world about the reforms 
of pension systems.  
Since the end of 19-th century, and especially since the World War II, 
most of the countries have established a public pension system based on the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) principle. According to the principle, current 
contributions of the active part of the population are transferred to the retired. 
The alternative way of organising pension system is a funded one, where the 
contributions of each worker are invested until his retirement. After the 
retirement he receives the accumulated money plus the income from 
investment in the form of either annuity or a lump-sum payment. The choice of 
PAYG system was stipulated by the growth of the economy and a favourable 
demographic situation, i.e. a growth of the population and a high ratio of an 
economically active part of the population to the retired one. The rentability of 
the PAYG system is equal to the growth rate of the economy, while the return 
on contributions to a funded system equals to the interest rate on the fund 
investment. 
During the last decades the growth rates of both population and labour 
productivity were declining. It affects the growth rate of the economy. Figures 
1-2 illustrate the change of the demographic situation. There are post and 
projected fertility and life expectancy combined by regions. The common path is 
a drop in fertility, increase in life expectancy and ageing of the population. Of 
course, the reasons of the aging vary among the regions.  
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Figure 1. Fertility rates. 
 
Figure 2. Life expectancy at birth. 
These tendencies make pension provision based on PAYG principle 
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pension systems. Very often it is an introduction of the fully funded part in the 
pension system. It is hoped that the reform increases labour market efficiency, 
spurs a domestic capital accumulation and counteracts a growing dependency 
ratio. On the other hand, the pension reform is costly.  
There is a vast amount of literature considering net effect of the reform. 
The tool commonly used for the analysis is a general equilibrium model. For 
example, Kortikoff (1996) made simulation analysis for USA and argues in 
favour of the funded system. Schimmelpfenning investigated this impact of the 
pension reform on a saving-investment balance and a current account balance 
for a small open economy. The result depends on the type of agents and a way 
of financing. He distinguishes between myopic and forward-looking agents. The 
latter change their contributions in response to the reform of the pension 
system, which increases a return on the contributions, while the formers don’t. 
In the economy of forward looking agents debt-financing leads to a reduction of 
savings and a fall of the current account balance, while tax-financing doesn’t 
affect savings and doesn’t deteriorate the current account.  
In this paper I consider Russian pension reform. In addition to the 
unfavourable demographic path Russia experiences a transition. It makes the 
reform of the pension system not only more urgent but also more difficult. 
Financing through the increase of the social tax rate is not possible, as the rate 
is very high. The use of debt-financing is also limited by the shortage of the 
state budget. There is one source of financing left. It is an increase in the tax 
compliance. A non-transparent environment and high payroll taxes favour an 
informal labour activity and tax evasion. The poor compliance is a severe 
problem for Russian economy. According to different estimates the share of the 
hidden taxes is about 30-50% of the revealed amount. There is a hope that the 
reform of the pension system can handle the problem. The introduction of the 
funded pillar increases the return on contributions to the pension provision. 
Hence it induces individuals to reveal larger part of their incomes. This 
revealed surplus can be used for the very reconstruction of the pension system. 
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In the paper I analyse the connection between the scale of the reform and 
an individual response in terms of tax compliance ratio. 
 
The structure of the work 
In the first chapter, I describe the pension system, which was inherited 
from the USSR. I devote special attention to the circumstances that made the 
reform urgent.  
The second chapter contains theoretical foundation of the problem. For 
the purpose of the paper I focus on the three types of the pension system: the 
Dutch type of PAYG, the German type of PAYG and the funded one. The 
pension system of the first type was inherited from the USSR. The combination 
of the second and third types is a projected multipillar pension system. For the 
description of the behaviour of economic agents for each system I use 
overlapping generation models.  
It will be shown that the funded system creates the strongest incentives 
to reveal the wage. At the same time, it is quite costly for the government to 
transform the pension system into a funded one. Under the tight budget, the 
reform can significantly reduce current pensions and a social stability in 
Russia. The elective government weights the transitional costs higher than the 
expected gain, since gain has long-run character, while costs has to be born 
today. As a result instead of the funded system the government introduces a 
partially–funded system. I.e. only part α (0<α<1) of the contributions is invested 
until the retirement period and the rest of pension system is organised as 
PAYG (German type). Such partially-funded system is called a multipillar 
system. 
Economic agents response to α by determining what part of their income 
to reveal. The higher α the larger part of the wage is revealed. For the analysis 
of the interaction between economic agents and government I use the 
Stackelberg sequential game.  
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The present conditions lead to a Pareto-inefficient outcome of the game. 
The reason is that government has no power (credible instruments) to reduce 
the tax evasion problem further, even though it could be more preferable for 
both the economic agents and the government.  
In the last chapter I relax some initial assumptions for the better 
description of the particular Russian situation. There are two instruments that 
can increase the tax compliance, apart the very reform. It is worth to take them 
into account when designing the new pension system. The first one is a 
punishment possibility. It is shown that the reduction of the tax evasion 
caused by the reform is greater in the presence of punishment. Another tool is 
a more even distribution of the social tax burden between employees and 
employer versus to the current situation when employer pays social tax. 
Although the two tools reduces the tax evasion they leave the outcome of 
the game to be Pareto-inefficient, since they don’t let government to constraint 
utility level.  
Afterwards, I take a look on the current reforms launched in the end of 
2001. The moderate scale of the reform corresponds to the result of the 
theoretical analysis. 
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Chapter 1 
Russian pension system. Motivation for the reform 
Russia inherited its pension system PAYG from the Soviet Union. In the 
soviet time the choice of PAYG was natural because of the redistributive 
character of the system and the solidarity between generations as its basic 
principle. A pension system is a part of the welfare state, the general path of 
which is determined by the political and economical background. The pension 
system served safeguard interests of a hierarchical structure of the Soviet 
State. The benefits of the people (wages, salaries, an access to public resources 
etc.) were determined by their position in the hierarchy. The higher position the 
higher the benefits. The type of welfare is called etatist. It creates a loyalty of 
the population and, thus, preserves itself. The whole economy was organised in 
the large state-owned enterprises and collective farms that provided full 
employment (hence loyalty) and suitable conditions for detailed planning, 
monitoring and controlling. The way the industry was organised helped to 
provide universal social security coverage and a well-developed social net. 
At the time when the pension system was designed the ability to provide 
social benefits was hardly a serious issue. The tax collection was a matter of 
transfers within the state apparatus. Money can be easily obtained in the form 
of transfers from the central budget. Besides, there were a favourable 
demographic situation and an economic growth.  
Hence the economic situation, the etatist type of the welfare state and 
the pension system based on PAYG-method supported each other and 
preserved by creating the loyalty of the population through the full employment 
and the sufficient average level of well-being 
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But even at that time the pension provision was not prosperous at all. 
According to Walter Connor1 the pensions went unchanged from 1932 to1956 
even though the wages rose by ten times during that period. 
Gradually, demographic and economic situations were changing, the 
population was growing old as a result of a drop in fertility. Initially, it was a 
result of the increase of the female labour force participation. A state rather 
than children provides the retired.  
Further on, the downward demographic trend was supported by the 
economical problems accumulated from the faults of the central planning. I 
mention them briefly: 
− The fixed structure of the industry that serves the purposes of the state 
rather than ordinary consumers. 
− The resource constraint character of the economy, the main feature of 
which is the deficit and hoarding of the resources and goods. 
− The decrease in the productivity as a consequence of a drop in the 
motivation of the people etc. 
Over the 1956-81 period a minimum wage rose by 160% while a 
minimum pension by only 67%.2 At the same period the pensioner population 
grew by 143%, that contributed to the state reluctance to raise pensions. 
Pensioners perforce turned to self-help and continued working. The USSR of 
the 1970-80s faced the problem of a chronic labour “shortage”. It got some of 
extra workers it needed by the drawing on those who could not live on the 
pensions.  
One of the features of the Soviet pension system was its universal 
coverage. It was also characterized by a tremendous variation among 
recipients. There were a great number of special privileges that depend on a 
period of working, a geographical location and occupational terms. The main 
reason of the high variety was that the state used the pension system as a tool 
                                                          
1 Walter Connor, ”Social Policy under Communism,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Sustaining the 
Transition: The Social Safety Net in Postcommunist Europe. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,1997.  
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for non-pension provision purposes, e.g. to encourage people to work in the 
northern parts.  
There were no private retirement plans. 
The social tax is the main one paid by the employer from the payroll. In 
the USSR and then in Russia the burden of the social taxes was (and is) quite 
heavy: 38,5% of the payroll until 2001 and 35,6% since then. The social tax 
consists from the pension one (28%), the tax paid to the State and Regional 
medicine funds (3,6%) and the social insurance tax (4%). For comparison, there 
are pension and insurance tax rates for several countries listed in the table 1.  
Table 1.1. Pension and social tax rates, mid-1990. 
 As percentage of Gross Wage: As percentage of Total 
Labor Costs: 
 
Pension  
Tax:  All Social  All 
Social
Country Employ
er 
Employ
ee 
Total Insurance 
Taxes 
Pension 
Tax 
Insura
nce Taxes
Armenia 35,0 1,0 36,0 38,0 26,3 27,7
Belarus 22,8 1,0 23,8 24,8 19,2 20,0
Estonia 20,0 0,0 20,0 33,0 15,0 24,8
Georgia 37,0 1,0 38,0 41,0 27,1 29,3
Kyrgyzstan 33,0 2,5 35,5 43,5 25,3 31,0
Russian Fed. 28,0 1,0 29,0 40,0 20,9 28,8
Albania 26,0 10,0 36,0 42,5 27,2 32,1
Croatia 13,0 13,0 26,0 43,0 21,0 36,0
Czech 
Republic 
20,4 6,8 27,2 48,5 20,1 35,9
Poland 45,0 0,0 45,0 48,0 30,4 32,4
Slovenia 15,5 15,5 31,0 45,8 25,2 37,2
Germany 10,2 10,2 20,3 42,0 17,0 34,0
France 10,0 7,0 16,0 51,0 12,0 38,0
Canada 3,0 3,0 6,0 15,2 4,9 13,9
Switzerland 4,9 4,9 9,8 19,3 8,7 17,1
United 6,2 6,2 12,4 21,0 10,4 18,5
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Source is Walter Connor, see footnote 1. 
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States 
Mexico 10,9 4,6 15,5 26,0 6,5 21,5
Japan 8,3 8,3 16,5 29,1 14,1 24,9
Chile  0,0 13,0 13,0 21,0 12,9 20,7
Source: Palacios, R. and Pallares-Miralles, M., “International Patterns of Pension 
Provision”, World Bank report, April 2000.  
We can notice that, on average, social and pension tax rates are higher 
for the countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe than for other 
regions (OECD, North Africa and Middle East, Latin America). The second 
common feature is small rates of direct workers’ contributions paid from their 
personal income (1% in Russia). So the cost of pension provision are placed 
almost entirely on the enterprises. This is a heritage of the described above 
principle the welfare system of the soviet type was built on. According to it 
enterprises, the majority of which were state-owned, were responsible for the 
well-being of the workers, providing a social net and a social tax compliance. 
Soft budget constraints of the enterprises made it possible.  
The transition worsens living conditions (a high inflation in the beginning 
of the transition period caused a decrease in the real wages in the formal 
sector) and strengthens the demographic patterns. On the figure 1.1 we can 
see the decreasing ratio of the population aged from 20 to 59 and those who 
are over 60. It illustrates the aging of the population.  
Ratio of the population aged from 20 to 59 and 
population over 60 years old
3,3
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Source:  Palacios, R. and Pallares-Miralles, M., “International Patterns of Pension 
Provision”, World Bank report, April 2000. 
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Figure 1.1. Past and projected ratio of the population aged from 20 to 59 and population over 60 
years old in Russia. 
The inherited drawbacks from the former system, accompanied with 
current transitional problems, made the pension provision harder. 
 The privatization broke the former structure of the industry. There were 
crucial changes in the industrial structure: the number of small firms and self-
employed individuals increased; the transparency of environment decreased; 
the informal sector grew.  
Budget constraints of the enterprises became hard. A high open 
unemployment favours a flexible employment policy to be the dominant one. 
Such conditions of the labour market construct certain type of employer-
employee relations. An employer doesn’t care about his workforce. Under these 
circumstances the high payroll taxes induce an informal employment3, an 
underreporting of incomes4 and a tax evasion problem. A non-transparent 
environment makes it possible.  
Apart from the highlighted reasons there is another important problem 
that contributes to the low tax compliance.  
Current PAYG has the highly complex system of benefits. The system 
guarantees near-universal coverage to a worker, regardless of his 
contributions. Initial pension benefits are typically based on the previous 
earnings and years of service. The eligibility rules are broad and differentiated, 
with special regimes for favoured occupations and other groups. There are a 
great number of preferential pensions. There is also a growing incidence of 
invalidity pensions and an early retirement, often with benefits that are higher 
then the average level.  
The unfavourable demographic trends, the early retirement ages and 
growing informal sector reduce the number of contributors. In contrast, the 
                                                          
3 Besides of all it makes the employees of such enterprises unsecured (no contract, small pension fees paid for the workers). 
4 The indirect evidence of hiding is the decreasing ratio of the wage in the overall incomes of population. 
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number of recipients is increasing. A quite severe increase of recipients is 
expected during the nearest 10 years. It is connected with the retirement of the 
kids of after-war-baby-boom. 
As a result today in Russia system dependency ratio5 of the number of 
pensioners to the total employed is 60/100. According to the forecast it will 
increase up to 70/100 in 2015, 80/100 in 2023, 90/100 in 2033 and 108/100 
in 2056.6 
The growing dependency ratio, the low tax compliance, accompanied with 
the budget deficit and the shortage of the money available for social security 
purpose, leads to the solvency problem of the current PAYG. In spite of the 
high social taxes the State Pension Fund is unable to provide promised 
benefits7. It results in the accumulation of large arrears, an incomplete 
indexation, keeping a growth rate of the pension payment well bellow the 
growth rate of the nominal GDP. A pension expenditure didn’t rise much in 
relation to the GDP during 1990s and even declined in the period between 
1993-96. 
In its turn, it makes employees unsure in their own future pension and 
reduces the incentives for workers to reveal their real incomes that lowers 
revenue inflows of the Pension fund. There is a vicious circle.  
The forecast, which was done by E.L. Iakushev, illustrates that if we leave 
current pension system unchanged then pension will decline to 46% in 2050 
(100% is the level of 1996). The analysis was carried by means of a simulation 
model of PAYG that takes into account the demographic trend and the 
following features of the current pension system:  
− The contributions are equal to the 29% of the payroll, 
                                                          
5 We should distinguish between system dependency ratio, which was defined above, and demographic dependency ratio, which 
is the ratio between number of persons over 60 years and number of persons between 15 and 59 years. The last ratio for Russia is 
36/100. The discrepancy between these two ratios illustrates that pension system was design with substantial drawbacks.   
6 For OECD countries the ratio is 47/100, for Latin America and Caribbean it is 25/100, East Asia and Pacific region it is 
20/100, North Africa and Middle East 30/100. The source is [1]  
7 There are several reasons: misusing of the money in the non-insurance programmes, growing unemployment, shadow economy 
and hidden employment, fall in the real wages and wage arrears, growing debts of enterprises to the Pension Fund. For example, 
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− All economic active population (men from 20 to 60 and women from 20 to 
50) pay the taxes, 
− The benefits are paid to everybody who has reached the retirement age (60 
for men and 55 for women),  
− A redistribution principle of the pension system. 
 The result is represented in the figure 1.2.  
In fact, PAYG became a crude safety net, providing small amounts of 
benefits to a large section of the population. 
Relative size of the future pension
(level of 1996=100%)
100 104
109 103
90
78 72 69 64
57
50 46
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
19
96
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
year
%
 fr
om
 th
e 
ba
si
c 
le
ve
l o
f
19
96
 
Figure 1.2. The size of future pension relativly to the level of 1996. 
Source: E.L. Iakushev. Crises in pension provision. Aged population and future 
Russian pension system. 1999 
So the situation argues for the reform to be held. A bankruptcy of 
current PAYG calls for the pension system built on different principles.  
The alternative to PAYG, the funded system, has several important 
advantages: doesn’t distort individual decisions about savings and labour-
leisure, accumulates a pool of money available for domestic investment. It 
creates incentives to reveal wages through the clearer link between 
contributions and benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in the middle of 1998 the debt was 88 bln. rub. that was equal to the half of the Fund’s budget. Later on, there were penalties 
introduced to prevent arrears of paying taxes. 
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Since fully funded system is based on the completely different principles 
it is hard to establish it at once. The common among transitional countries 
solution is “multipillar” approach, which was chosen by Russia as well. It 
combines PAYG and the fully funded systems through the contributions to a 
retirement account. The first pillar is a current PAYG reduced in the scale, it 
implies a wide coverage of the population with a low provision. The second 
pillar is based on the funded principle. The part of the benefits corresponding 
to the funded pillar has a close connection with the contributions made by and 
in favour of the worker. In addition to the two pillars, it is planned to develop 
occupational and voluntary supplementary insurance schemes (third pillar).  
Such reconstruction costs a lot. Hence, it puts a quite heavy burden on 
the government, which has to provide current recipients as well as accumulate 
and invest money for the next generation’s pension (according to the principles 
of the funded system). Besides, it has to build the infrastructure for the new 
second pillar: an informational database, a law provision, a control system over 
insurance companies. Since the life-insurance is very important for the social 
stability it is among the primary interests of the state.   
So, taking into account a tight state budget, revealed wages can be a 
significant inner source for the financing of the reconstruction of the pension 
system. That’s why one of the targets of the reform is to change the behaviour 
of the economic agents and to induce them to reveal their incomes.  
The paper examines the success of the reform with respect to the tax 
evasion. Chapter 2 analyses Russian reform by means of a simple game-
theoretical model. Chapter 3 expands the model by including several important 
details omitted in the original model: the influence of the labour market and 
punishment for tax evasion.    
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CHAPTER 2 
Before describing the behaviour of economic agents, a government and 
the interaction between them I should emphasise some details that are 
important for the analysis of the pension provision performance in Russia. 
1.  The problem of income hiding is especially severe for private enterprises of 
small and average size. In the non-transparent environment the companies 
have a lot of opportunities to hide part of the payroll. The reconstruction of 
the pension system from PAYG to the fully funded one is supposed to 
change mainly the behaviour (increase the revealed part of the income) of 
the individuals occupied in these enterprises. For large companies the 
opportunities to hide are reduced by the yearly obligatory checks of 
supervisors (the tax polity, accounting firms, etc.) But they still hide some 
part of the wages to reduce taxes. For state-owned enterprises the problem 
of revenue hiding is negligible. In the following model z is a revealed share of 
the income. As it was mentioned above, z varies among enterprises of 
different sizes and property-owners. I consider the average level of the 
incomes revealed by the economically active population. 
2. For the time being I slightly exaggerate situation by assuming that this is 
the worker who pays social taxes from the income earned. In fact, in Russia 
an employer pays social taxes from the payroll. The interpretation of the 
assumption can be the following. The agent is considered to be a self-
employed or a small firm. By the exaggeration I exclude the influence of the 
labour market. It doesn’t change the results of the model. In the third 
chapter I drop the assumption to consider the labour market conditions.  
3. A pension tax (29%) is a major part of a social one (35,6%). Further in the 
paper I focus the attention only on the pension tax (denote it τ), since I am 
interested in the pension provision, and neglect other taxes (the income tax 
13,5% and non-pension social taxes).   
4. The whole population can be divided into two parts:  
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− An economically active part. It is people before the retirement (Nt). They 
contribute to the pension system.  
− The retired (Nt+1) who receive pension benefits. 
5. The demographic situation in Russia is an aging of the population, i.e. 
Nt+1=(1-n)Nt, where n is a rate of the decrease of the population.  
6. All agents are identical. The assumption is very strong, but it is not crucial 
for the result of the current analysis. The assumption allows to avoid an 
unreasonable sophistication.  
7. There is no informational asymmetry between the economic agents and the 
government. I.e. the government knows about hiding and can estimate the 
response function of the individuals. The information about government 
decisions is available.  
 
2.1.The model of the individual behaviour  
The life of every economic agent is divided by the retirement into two 
periods.  
1. During the first one (active) before the retirement the individual works and 
earns all his life-time income wt. From the payroll he has to pay social tax τ. 
Before paying he determines z – the share of the income that he reveals 
(0≤z≤1). The tax payment is equal to τzwt. The individual is left with the 
disposable income (wt-τzwt). Part of it is spent on the consumption in the 
first period c1,t and the rest st is saved and invested under the interest rate 
rt+1,i. Subscript i denotes that it is the interest rate that individual can get 
on the personal investment.  So in the next period individual get 
Rt+1,ist=(1+rt+1,i)st, where Rt+1,I - is the return on the individual investment. 
Hence, economic agent has two options to save: (a) the personal saving with 
the return Rt+1,i and (b) the contributions to the pension system with the 
return Rt+1,p. It is reasonable to expect the individual to choose the option 
with the highest return. I omit the possibility that the individual can be 
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caught and forced to pay some penalty. It is stipulated by the fact that in 
Russia the punishment penalty is not that high and individuals do not take 
the punishment into account when they determine z. An additional reason 
is that the attention of the paper is focused on how the transformation to a 
multipillar pension system changes the individual decisions about the 
allocation of savings between the two options. For this purpose I abstract 
from the punishment.  
2. During the second period after the retirement an economic agent earns 
nothing, but he gets Rt+1,ist from his private savings and pt+1 – the pension 
payment from the obligatory state pension provision. The money are spent 
on the consumption c2,t+1.  
Every agent compares returns on personal and pension savings and chooses 
s,t and z to solve the following problem  
Max v(c1,t,c2,t+1)=U(c1,t)+(1+θ)-1 U(c2,t+1) (2.1) 
Subject to budget constrains for the two periods 
c1,t+st=wt-τzwt=(1-τz)wt (2.2)  
c2,t+1= Rt+1,ist+pt+1 (2.3) 
where v(.) is an individual utility function that can be separated for the 
two periods. The utility function has standard properties, i.e. continuos, 
concave and twice-differentiable U’>0, U”<0.  
θ- is a discount rate. In the model we abstract from inflation. 
From the budget equation (2.2) it is clear that the real tax zτ on the 
labour income is less then announced τ. The individual regulates the tax rate 
by himself. This is the core of the tax evasion problem.  
The more detailed form of budget constraint (2.3) depends on the type of 
pension system. There are two main types: PAYG and Fully funded one. In real 
life countries have mixed pension systems. For the purpose of our analysis it is 
worth to describe three types: 
1. Dutch type of PAYG.  
2. German type of PAYG. 
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3. Fully Funded pension system. 
The first type of pension system was inherited by Russia from the Soviet 
Union. The two other types are the parts of the designed new pension system. 
 Dutch Type of PAYG  
Under this pension system the individual perceives the premium 
payment as a flat rate tax on his labour income; and the individual perceives 
the pension as a lump-sum subsidy.  
All the contributions collected in the period t are distributed among the 
current recipients. PAYG has a distributive character. 
It has another name “defined–benefit plans”, since contributors receive 
an “entitlement” to predetermined benefits, usually linked to workers’ age, years 
of employment and past earnings. But the benefits don’t depend directly on the 
contributions made in the active period. 
Russia inherited this type of system from the Soviet Union.  
To put it in numbers, such kind of a pension system implies that  
)1(111
1111
1 nwzN
Nwz
p ttt
t
tttt
t −== ++++++++ ττ  (2.4) 
The numerator is the contributions collected in the period t+1 and the 
denominator is the total number of pensioners in the period. I.e. the pension 
system has a distributive character. Pension payment 1+tp  doesn’t depend on 
earnings in the active period tw .  
German Type of PAYG  
This type of pension system remains distributive. I.e. all the 
contributions collected in the period t are distributed among the current 
recipients. The difference between the German and the Dutch types is that, 
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under the German System individual contributions are taken into account 
when defining a pension payment. Thus the connection between contributions 
and benefits is closer than under the Dutch System. 
A pension benefit in this case is: 
11 ++ Σ


Σ= tt
ttt
t
wz
p
τ
 (2.5) 
where tΣ - is the total taxes collected in the period t. Due to the 
assumption about identity of all agents ttttt Nwzτ=Σ . And the expression in [.] 
in (2.5) is a share of payment made by the agent. 
Assuming that τ t =τ t+1=τ and zt =zt+1=z, (2.5) can be rewritten as: 
 11 ++ = ttt Gzwp τ  (2.6) 
where )1(1111 nw
w
Nw
Nw
G
t
t
tt
tt
t −== ++++  is a growth factor of the total wage. It is 
affected by the demographic changes (through the term (1-n)), the technological 
progress and an increase of the labour productivity (through the dynamics of 
the wage 
t
t
w
w 1+ ). It is followed from (2.6) that Rt+1,p= 1+tG , i.e. the growth factor of 
the total wage 1+tG is the return the individual can get on contributions to the 
German system. 
Fully Funded Pension System 
Its another name is defined-contribution plans. By contrast with the 
defined-benefit plans, the defined-contribution plans specify in advance the 
individuals’ contribution to the pension system, but not the benefit. In this 
case, the contributions that every agent made during the active period are 
invested until the retirement. Future benefits depend on the accumulated 
contributions and the rates of return on the fund investments.  
Under the fully funded system the pension payment is determined as 
follows: 
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pt+1=R t+1,fτtztwt (2.7) 
where R t+1,f is the return on contributions to the fully funded pension 
system.  
Comparison of the different types of the pension system with 
respect to their ability to solve tax evasion problem 
Let us start with the Dutch type of PAYG. The individual maximisation 
problem is (2.1) - (2.4). 
By differentiating the individual utility function v with respect to z, we get 
0/1 <−= Uwdz
dv
tτ , where 
t
t
c
cUU
,1
,1/
1
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∂
∂=  is the marginal utility of the first-period 
consumption. Since the pension payment pt+1 doesn’t depend on the 
contribution, increase in z implies increase in the contribution without 
compensation in the form of increased benefits in the retirement period. So 
increase in z reduces the individual utility. Hence, a rational agent reduces z as 
much as possible and saves by his own for the retirement period. In terms of 
the model, he sets z to be equal to 0.  
This is a quite usual situation in Russia where agents declare their 
incomes to be equal to the allowed deductions. These deductions are made 
from the payroll before the payment of taxes. This is a common way to set z=0. 
Of course, in real life the lower limit of z can be above 0 if we take into account 
the possibility of the officials to check the person and force him to pay some 
penalty. But the system itself doesn’t create incentives to reveal income.  
The first order conditions for the individual problem (2.1)-(2.3) for the 
Dutch system, where pt+1 is determined by (2.4), are: 
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21 
 
Where 
1,2
1,2/
2
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+ ∂
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t
t
c
cUU is the marginal utility of second-period 
consumption. 
Under the German pension system, the first order conditions for the 
maximisation problem (2.1)-(2.3) and (2.6), will be (2.8), (2.10). It should be 
note that the first order conditions for the personal savings variable s are the 
same for all pension systems, since design of the pension systems doesn’t 
change the personal saving opportunity. The mechanisms of savings to pension 
system vary among the pension systems. 
For the German system it is 
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Thus 
21
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So the individual chooses the personal savings (s) and the revealing 
parameter (z) so as to equalise marginal costs from the revealed share with the 
marginal revenue. The source of the marginal cost (-τzwtU’1): increasing z 
increases the tax payment and reduces the consumption in the first period. 
The marginal revenue is a discounted value of utility of the additional unit of 
the pension payment (1+θ)-1τzwtGt+1U’2 received from the increased tax payment 
in the first period.  
For the fully funded system the individual maximization problem is (2.1)-
(2.3), (2.7) and the first order conditions are (2.8), (2.12). 
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I.e. the agent chooses point (st, z) so that the marginal disutility from 
paying the social tax is equal to the discounted value of the marginal utility 
from the increase in pension payment pt+1 in the after-retirement period. 
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As it was mentioned above, every person has two savings opportunities. 
Let us look on the individual marginal rate of substitution between the 
contribution to the pension system and the personal savings.  
For the Dutch type of PAYG it is (2.13). It is derived from the 
maximisation problem (2.1)-(2.3), (2.4).  
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For the German type of PAYG the marginal rate of substitution, which is 
derived from (2.1)-(2.3), (2.6), is  
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The two ratios differ because the denominators are different. The 
denominator in (2.14) is greater than that of (2.13) since 0)1( 121
1 >+ +− UGtθ . So 
the transformation from the Dutch type of PAYG to the German type decreases 
the marginal rate of substitution between the contribution to pension system 
and the personal savings. In other words, an individual’s value of the 
opportunity to save in the pension system increases relatively to the value of 
the personal saving opportunity. It illustrates that the reconstruction of PAYG 
from the Dutch type to the German one does create the incentives for the agent 
to reveal some wage, i.e. zGERM>zDUTCH≈0. 
For the Fully Funded pension system (2.1)-(2.3), (2.7) the individual 
marginal rate of substitution between contribution to the pension system and 
personal savings is equal to  
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It is very similar to equation (2.14) for the German type of PAYG. It 
means that the transition to the funded system from the Dutch type of PAYG 
also creates the incentives to reveal an income. The only difference between the 
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marginal rates of substitution of the fully funded and the German systems is 
the return on pension contributions. For the German type of PAYG the return 
is 1+tG (growth factor of the total wage), while for the fully funded it is 
Rt+1,f=1+ ftr ,1+ .  
As it was said above the population in Russia is sharply declines during 
the last decades. A demographic forecast predicts that the situation will remain 
the same. If in addition we neglect the technical progress (i.e. 
),( 111 +++ == ttLtt LKFww ) then the return nGt −=+ 11 . Thus the return 1+tG  on 
individual contributions to the German type of PAYG is less then the one of the 
fully funded system Rt+1,f. It makes the fully funded system more preferable for 
individuals, since the return on contributions is higher than that of PAYG. 
Hence the denominator in the right-hand side of (2.15) is greater than 
that of (2.14). It means that for an individual the relative importance of the 
savings to the pension system (“relative” with respect to private savings 
opportunity) is higher for the fully funded pension system then for the German 
system. Thus the funded system induces the individual to reveal the higher 
share of income (z) than PAYG and solves the tax evasion problem better. 
“Multipillar” Pension System  
The advantage of the funded system in dealing with tax evasion problem 
can be seen from the analyses of the performance of the following “multipillar” 
pension system. It consists of two pillars: (i) the German type of PAYG and (ii) 
the funded pillar.  
α is a share of the funded system.  
The budget constraint for the retirement period (2.3) is 
c2,t+1=Rt+1st+(αRt+1 +(1-α)Gt+1) τzwt (2.16) 
Where R t+1=R t+1,f=R t+1,i. It is assumed for simplicity that the return on 
contributions to the fully funded pension system Rt+1,f is equal to the return on 
the individual investment Rt+1,i.  
24 
 
The first order conditions for the problem (2.1)-(2.3), (2.16) are (2.8) and 
(2.17). 
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From the system of the first order conditions (2.8) and (2.17) we obtain 
(2.18). 
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Because of the assumptions made about the shape of the utility function 
the denominator is positive. Thus the sign of the whole expression depends on 
the sign of the numerator. Taking into account that Rt+1>Gt+1 (was shown 
above), the sign of the numerator coincides with sign of the following 
expression:  
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It is easy to see that the expression (2.19) has a positive sign.  
As a result, 0>αd
dz . It means a comparative advantage of the funded 
system in its dealing with the problem of tax evasion.  
This is quite intuitive result because the individual invests money to the 
more profitable option. The return on the saving to the funded system 1+tR is 
greater than 1 and, hence, higher than the return of PAYG 1+tG , which is less 
than 1, because of the unfavourable demographic trend and neglected 
technical progress. A higher share of the funded pillar α increases the return 
on the pension savings and induces individuals to reveal the larger parts of 
their incomes. 
Multipillar pension system, which is introduced now8, has α equal to 
0,07 with a further increase up to 0,2 (or in terms of contributions 2-6% from 
28% tax is invested until the retirement period). 
                                                          
8 Law about pension provision was accepted in December 2001. According to it ”new” pension system has to be introduced in 
the 2002. 
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On the figure 2.1 there are the indifference curves of the economic agent 
and the response curve z(α), which is proven to be upward sloping with the 
decreasing marginal propensity to reveal. The response curve is the locus of the 
lowest points of the indifference curves. Since in the absence of the funded 
pillar α=0 the pension system is of German type, the individual reveals some 
share of the wage. It was shown above that the German type of PAYG reduces 
the tax evasion problem, although not so effectively as the funded one. 
There can be the following explanation of the shape of the indifference 
curve in the z-α space. A higher share of the funded pillar α implies a higher 
return on the pension contribution and increases utility level v.  
In its turn, an increasing z implies higher tax payment in the first period 
and higher pension payment in the second. Thus the utility of the first period 
consumption U1 decreases, while the utility of the second period U2 increases. 
However the impact of z on the total utility v varies for different z. For small z 
the increase of the second-period, caused by the increased pension, is higher 
than the corresponding decrease of the utility, caused by the drop of the first-
period consumption. Thus the total utility v increases. To keep utility level 
constant we have to decrease α. It stipulates the decreasing part of the 
indifference curve in the z-α space. The higher z the greater the marginal 
disutility of the further reduction of the first-period consumption and the less 
is the marginal utility of an increase of the pension payment (it follows from the 
concavity of the utility functions U-s). Hence the total utility v decreases. To 
keep it constant we have to increase α. It stipulates the increasing part of the 
indifference curve.   
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Figure 2.1. Indifference and response curves of the economic agent. 
We can rank systems with respect to their ability to solve the tax evasion 
problem as follows: the funded one is the first best, the German type of PAYG is 
the second best. 
Influence of the tax rate and general economic conditions on the 
tax evasion  
Let us now investigate how individual propensity to reveal z depends on τ 
and θ. 
By differentiating both first order conditions (2.8) and (2.17) for the 
maximization problem in the case of multipillar pension system and by 
applying Cramer’s rule it can be obtained.  
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The function z(τ) is decreasing. It is convex. To show this I differentiate 
the above equality with respect to a tax rate τ.  
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When the social tax rate increases, the individual reveals smaller share 
of his income and hides more income. The positive marginal propensity 
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increased tax rate. Thus, financing of the reform through the increase of the 
social tax rate has a serious drawback – a drop in the tax compliance.  
In connection with the result it is worth to mention that in 2001 the rate 
of the social tax was reduced from 38,5% to 35,6% although the pension tax 
remained the same (28%). The social tax became regressive. Such kind of tax is 
supposed to create incentives to reveal the incomes. But the possibility to use 
the regression is available for companies that pay more than 100.000 rbl. to 
each worker (it is 3.500$) annually. It implies quite high salaries. For 
comparison, according to the Committee of State Statistics, an average per 
capita money income is about 1600$. 
Let us now consider the effect of the increased discount rate θ. 
From the same system of first order conditions (2.8), (2.17) by the 
calculations for θ, similar to those for the tax rate, we derive  
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We can give at least three interpretations to the result:  
a) The increase of the discount rate makes the future less valuable for the 
agent. Hence he prefers to spend his income on the consumption in the first 
period and decreases the revealed part z. 
b) The second interpretation of θ is a measure of trust of the agent to the 
government. The higher θ the less trust and the less individual propensity to 
reveal income. By only increasing the trust we can get larger reduction in 
the tax evasion. Actually, the problem of the trust is a key one for Russia. 
An indicator of the distrust of the population to the state pension policy can 
be illustrated by the results of the inquiry that was held by the Russian 
Research Center in 1-5 of June 2001. One of the questions was “Would you 
pay voluntary contributions to the state pension system to get benefits in 
addition to an ordinary state pension payment”. The result was 51% “yes” 
versus 40% “no”.  
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c) The third interpretation of θ is a risk that whether the individual or system 
may not be alive in the second period. With respect to the survival of the 
pension system it means that the pension system may be replaced by the 
totally different one due to the change of the whole economic and social 
systems.  
 
In terms of the individual response curve, the increase of tax rate or 
uncertainty (reduction in trust to the government) shifts the response curve to 
the left. And for every α the revealed part of the income becomes smaller.  
 
Comparison of German type of PAYG and the Funded system 
with respect to distortion of individual saving and labour-leisure 
decision 
Let us now, turn back to the comparison of the two pension systems the 
German PAYG and the funded one. 
One of the advantages of the funded system is the accumulated capital 
that can be invested in a domestic economy.  
Besides, the funded system doesn’t distort an individual decision about 
savings. To prove this statement let us consider the economy without any 
pension system. The individual maximization problem is  
Max v(c1,t,c2,t+1)=U(c1,t)+(1+θ)-1 U(c2,t+1) (2.20) 
Subject to the budget constrains for the two periods 
c1,t+st=wt (2.21)  
c2,t+1= Rt+1,ist (2.22) 
It is easy to check that the first order conditions of the problem are 
identical to the ones in the case of the funded pension system (2.8) and (2.17). 
The reason of the equivalence is that the agent considers pension contributions 
as personal savings, when the return (Rt+1) on contributions in the funded 
system is equal to the return that the agent can get on his personal savings.  
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It was shown above that the first order conditions of the both types of the 
PAYG differ from (2.8) and (2.17). Hence PAYG does distort the individual 
savings behaviour.   
Several papers9 are devoted to the problem of the labour supply 
distortion. It arises when labour supply is considered to be an endogenous 
variable that depends on the net wage rate.  
In the case of an endogenous labour supply the individual problem  can 
be represented as (2.23)-(2.25): 
 Max v(c1,t, c2,t+1,1-Lt)=U(c1,t,1-Lt)+(1+θ)-1 U(c2,t+1)  (2.23) 
With respect to st and Lt. 
Subject to the budget constrains for the two periods 
c1,t+st= (1-τz)wtLt (2.24)  
c2,t+1= Rt+1st+pt+1 (2.25) 
where Lt –is an individual labour supply, and 1- Lt denotes leisure. 
From the first order conditions for the three types of pension systems 
(the types differ because of different form of the pension payment pt+1) we 
derive the marginal rates of substitution between the leisure and consumption. 
The result is presented in the table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Marginal rate of substitution in different systems. 
Type of pension 
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9 E.g. Homburg,S.(1997), BrunnerJ.K.(1996) 
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Funded 
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LU −′1 - the marginal utility of leisure. 
The first raw corresponds to the benchmark case, when there is no 
pension system, and hence no distortion in the supply of labour. The marginal 
rate of substitution corresponding to the funded system is the same as in the 
benchmark case (it holds as long as return on pension saving is equal to return 
on personal saving). It means that the funded system doesn’t distort the 
labour-leisure individual decision. By contrast, the marginal rates of 
substitution for both types of PAYG differ from the benchmark case. PAYG 
increases a relative utility of leisure, reduces labour supply and makes 
individuals worse off.  
The PAYG payroll tax drives a wedge between a consumer wage and 
labour costs. There is no fiscal equivalence between contributions and benefits 
and the implicit rate of return of PAYG is lower than return on personal 
savings. It leads to the reduction in the labour supply.  
Hassler and Lindberck (1997) showed that the labour decision would be 
distorted as long as a marginal increase in contributions generates an increase 
in benefits with a lower market value to individual than the value of 
contributions. So the funded system, as one that increases the ratio of 
marginal contributions to marginal savings, induces higher labour supply and 
reduces the labour distortions caused by the payroll tax. 
Financing of PAYG from the social tax on the labour income implies a 
dead-weight loss.  The higher the tax rate the larger the dead-weight loss. 
Under the German type the individual considers only part of the contributions 
as the tax on labour income. It can be derived from the first order conditions of 
the maximization task for the German type that the implicit tax rate = 
]1[
1
1
+
+−
t
t
R
Gzτ . It is less then tax rate zτ. The share 
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t
R
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perceived by the individual as “savings”. Thus the German type of PAYG 
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implies less dead-weight loss then Dutch one. The ranking of the systems with 
respect to the labour-leisure distortions coincides with the one with respect to 
the ability to solve the tax evasion problem: the funded is first-best, the 
German system is the second-best.  
It is shown by Stefan Homburg (1997) that, as transition to the funded 
system eliminates this dead-weight loss, the government can use the surplus 
for Pareto-optimal converting to a funded system. The main transitional 
problem is that at the same time the government has to not only accumulate 
and invest contributions of the current active workers, but also provide 
presently living elderly. Homburg suggests converting the implicit dead-weight 
loss into a regular government debt. The funded system makes the following 
generations better of. It allows an increasing taxation of the following 
generation to reduce the government loan. 
Johan Brunner (1996) extends the model by relaxing the assumption 
about identical individuals. His conclusion is that “any replacement of PAYG by 
the funded system, intended to reduce the dead-weight loss, normally involves 
intragenerational redistribution and therefore conflicts with Pareto criterion. 
The main argument goes as follows. If the growth rate of the economy is lower 
then the interest rate, a contribution to PAYG pension system reduces life-time 
income. The loss is the higher, the higher the contributions. Thus, given that 
individuals have different incomes, PAYG system imposes different losses of the 
life-time income on them. As a consequence, if proportional contributions (and 
benefits) are replaced by lump-sum ones, the condition for Pareto-improvement 
requires that the lump-sum contributions are in some way differentiated 
between individuals (as in proportional system). However, this instrument is 
not available, because the government does not have precise knowledge that 
are necessary to identify individuals by their primary characteristic.” 
As an alternative method of initiating a transition to the funded system 
(instead of lump-sum taxation), we could replace the proportionality rule by a 
more sophisticated method of determining income-related contributions and 
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benefits. Such a change might also reduce the excess burden caused by PAYG, 
and this gain might allow a Pareto-improving transition. In his studies Brunner 
considers an affine relation between contribution and gross income. But again, 
the introduction of such a rule would represent an act of redistribution, 
making at least one individual worse off. He concludes that, except in special 
cases, no implementable instrument exists that could be used for a Pareto- 
improving transition from PAYG to the funded system. 
2.2. Government decision 
Now it is time to summarize the advantages and drawbacks of the two 
alternative pension schemes – PAYG and the Funded one.  
PAYG 
The drawbacks of PAYG are related to efficiency, equity and risk 
problems. 
Problems related to efficiency 
− Large PAYG systems typically result in the labour market distortions. The 
high level of contribution rates is needed to support the systems, combined 
with a loose link between benefits and contributions, transform the 
contribution rate into tax. It results in the reduction of the employment and 
tax compliance and the development of underground activities. 
Furthermore, often generous early retirement provisions lead to a decline in 
the labour participation rates of cohorts of those who are younger than the 
statutory retirement age (and therefore to decline in contribution base). 
− It is often argued that PAYG pension schemes reduce incentive for private 
savings and capital accumulation. However the evidence of it is not 
conclusive and the impact of pension reform on private saving behaviour 
remains controversial. I’ve already mentioned the work of Schimmelpfenning 
(2000) related to the topic. 
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Problems related to equity 
− Although one of the main advantages of mandatory defined-benefit public 
pension scheme is its ability to redistribute income from high to low-wage 
workers, the evidence from industrial countries suggests that in practice the 
system tend to be regressive. This is due to design features that tend to 
benefit workers with a high-income profile. The high-income people live 
longer, have rising age income profiles, and join labour force later (and thus 
have shorter contributory periods). This drawback is not very severe for 
Russia where redistribution ability of PAYG is limited. The Russian pension 
provision is universal and moderate. Thus it doesn’t significantly increase 
the income of low-paid workers. 
− There is no equitable distribution of benefits and costs across generations; 
while the first generation of beneficiaries typically receives considerably 
more than they contributed, future retired generations typically face lower 
rates of return on their contributions, particularly in the case of aging 
populations. The system also promotes intragenerational inequities, since 
different rates of return may apply for contributors within a given cohort, 
owing (for example, because of different life expectancies). 
 Problems related to risk 
− Across the whole world pension funds are showing signs of financial stress, 
making the future size of public pension benefits and/or contribution rates 
uncertain. As the system matures, contributions start to fall short of what is 
needed to pay off the implicit pension debt. The budgetary costs of 
excessively generous benefits render unreformed systems financially 
unsustainable. It builds uncertainty into the systems. Both contributors 
and beneficiaries are placed under a risk, since either increased 
contributions or reduced benefits are likely to be required in the long-run to 
balance the accounts (the precise combination of adjustments could depend 
on the relative political weight on the groups of the population).   
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Advantages and disadvantages of the Funded system 
The adoption of the multipillar system with a mandatory funded pillar is 
typically justified by the expected economic and political advantages vis-à-vis 
PAYG systems.  
Based on theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence, Hemming (1998) 
concludes that the rate of return on investment is most likely to exceed the 
implicit return on PAYG systems in most countries. It means that the funded 
system accelerates the financial market development and promotes savings 
and capital accumulation. 
The funded system is more robust to demographic changes.  
Shift to the funded pension scheme establishes a close link between 
contributions and benefits and thus reduces labour market distortions and a 
tax evasion. 
From a political point of view, moving to a funded system is believed to 
represent a time-consistent policy and therefore is more credible than 
operating with PAYG. 
On the other hand, the successful implementation of the funded systems 
requires a number of economic, institutional and political pre-conditions. 
Besides the adequate legal and regulatory framework, the establishment of 
which can take time, there is one important pre-condition that Russia lacks- 
an active financial market. The development of privately managed pillars would 
require at least rudimentary capital markets and an adequate regulatory 
framework to limit an investment risk. The move to a funded system also can 
impose a heavy fiscal burden on the transitional generations, which would 
have to save for their own retirement and contribute to the old system.  
In addition, contributors face considerable risk, as pension benefits can 
fluctuate markedly and an adequate replacement rate is not guaranteed, since 
the funded systems do not have a redistribution component.  
It’s worth to note that the drawbacks of the funded system are mainly 
connected with the problems of transition to it. On the other hand, the 
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advantages of the system give it a potential to improve the performance of 
pension provision. It is very important in the presence of ill PAYG in Russia.  
The scale of the reform, or, alternatively, α - the size of the funded pillar, 
should be determined by a comparison of benefits and cost of the 
transformation to a new system. An additional problem arises from the fact 
that the decision about the scale of the reform is taken by the elective 
government, which has its own, different from the welfare maximisation, 
interests. One of them is an intention to retain the power in the next period. 
Thus it has to take into account the fact that the transformation, accompanied 
by the tight budget, may significantly reduce current pensions and social 
stability. It undermines the support for the government during the next 
election campaign. Thus the elective government weights transitional costs 
higher than the expected gain, since the gain has long-run character, while 
costs have to be born in the nearest future. 
Of course, it can be argued that the government can run a wide 
informational campaign to persuade people in the necessity of the tighter 
economical conditions. But it is unlikely to be very efficient in present 
conditions in Russia, where the trust of population to politicians about long-
run gains after short-run losses were overexploited.   
Let us turn to the main options for the government to finance the reform: 
(a) To use external sources (e.g. revenues from privatisation, a positive surplus 
in the budget, an explicit government debt etc.)  
(b) To reduce the number of beneficiaries through the tightening the eligibility 
rules for privilege pensions. 
(c) To increase contribution rates. 
(d) To improve a revenue collection. 
(e) To reduce the tax evasion. 
Further we consider the potential of the sources for Russia.  
(a) It is unlikely to use the external sources. There is a lack of money available 
for social sphere. Even a present growth caused by the favourable 
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conditions on the oil market can not be a strong basis for the long-run 
gradual reforms. Huge international debts (borrowed previously) make it 
impossible to use this source. The lack of the trust of the economic agents 
to the government limits the opportunity to use inner loans. 
(b) The number of privilege pensions has already been reduced. A further 
reduction of the pension benefits is not possible since in Russia the average 
pension payment is not far above the minimum living standard. The 
government should take into account that pension recipients are 40-45% of 
the electorate and the worsening of their living conditions decreases support 
for the government during a next election campaign. The social security 
topic is traditional for the left-wing parties that are a political opposition to 
the present government. 
(c) The contribution rates are high. We’ve shown above that the further 
increase causes more severe evasion and can reduce the contribution 
inflow. 
(d) The revenue collection can be increased by a stricter punishment through 
an increase in probability to be caught or higher penalties. It implies the 
improvement of the whole economical situation. In the presence of high 
corruption and wide spread bribes in Russia the proposed measures may 
not change the evasion behaviour of the agents in the expected direction.  
(e) Since the sources (a)-(d) are exhausted, the particular attention is devoted 
to the inner sources of the transformation. By means of the model, it was 
illustrated that the very reconstruction of the pension system changes the 
individual behaviour. It reduces tax evasion and increases a revenue inflow 
to the Pension fund.  
Since the mechanism of interaction between the reform and the change 
of the individual behaviour is so important, let us consider it in detail.  
We can interpret α as a measure of changes or a scale of reform. A higher 
α implies that the more considerable changes in the design of pension system 
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has to be made. The deeper reconstruction demands higher expenditures. The 
main components of the transitional costs are: 
− The costs of creating a new infrastructure: a new law provision, an 
informational campaign about changes for the population.  
− The costs of creating a new management system: either in the form of one 
state management company or several private companies. In the last case 
the system of monitoring and control over the companies has to be 
designed. 
− The expenditures of the provision of the current elderly to keep their living 
standard at least constant during the transition period. The proxy of 
constant living conditions can be the replacement rate, which is the ratio of 
a pension to a disposable wage. 
− The costs of designing long-run investment programs for the pension 
money. 
The costs of building a new infrastructure and management system are 
likely to be fixed ones, while the last two components of the transitional costs 
are variable. The Russian Transition Research Institute investigated the 
structure of the costs. By means of simulation model it was shown that 
marginal costs of transition are increasing in α. The main reason is a difficulty 
of financing the current pension benefits with the long run investment program 
under the strict budget constraints.  
By setting higher α the government expects to get higher revealed part z. 
But the higher α implies the higher costs that can’t be covered by the revealed 
surplus.  
The shape of the indifference curves for the government in α-z space is 
drawn on the figure 2.2. As it is more and more costly to find the external 
finances for further reconstruction, which is indicated by the increase of 
parameter α, the higher revealed share is needed to keep the utility of the 
government constant.  
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The arrows show the direction of the increase of the utility level. The 
lower evasion/higher revealed share z increases contributions and makes the 
transformation less costly for the government. Thus it increases its utility level. 
Figure 2.2. Indifference curves of the government. 
2.3. Stackelberg sequential game 
The interaction of the individuals and the government can be represented 
by the sequential 2-step game. 
In the first step the government sets α - the share of the pension system 
that is organised according to the funded principle. It means that α is a share 
of contributions that is invested until the retirement period and hence 
withdrawn from the current distribution among recipients. 
In the second step the individuals responses to α by setting z - the share 
of the wage that they reveal. The response function z(α) is a solution of 
maximization problem (2.1)-(2.3), (2.16) for given α. 
The outcome of the game can be derived by the method of a backward 
induction. According to our assumption, there are no informational distortions 
among the players of the game. It means that the government knows the 
individual response function z(α), derived from the second step and sets α so as 
to maximise its own utility function (first-step problem).  
1  
S3>S2
S
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The outcome of the game is shown on the figure 2.3. It is point A – the 
tangent of the individual response curve and the indifference curve of the 
government. 
Figure 2.3. The outcome of the Stackelberg game. 
The outcome is not Pareto-efficient. There is a whole set of (z, α) that is 
Pareto-improving. It is a shaded area on the figure 2.4. The higher values of z 
and α are more preferable for both the economic agents and the government.  
Figure 2.4. Pareto-inefficiency of the outcome of the game. 
For example, consider the point C, which is a tangent point of 
indifference curves v and S2 of the participants of the game. C is more 
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preferable as it leaves utility v of the individual unchanged and increases the 
utility of the government S2>S1.  
 
Figure 2.5. Pareto-optimal subset. 
In the Pareto-improving set there is a Pareto-optimal subset – the part of 
a contract line between the points B and C. The contract curve is a locus of the 
tangent points of the indifference curves of the players: the indifference curve 
of the individuals v-s and the indifference curves of the government S-s.   
The reason that the outcome is not Pareto-efficient is a lack of power of 
the government to elicit a larger share of the hidden income. It remains until 
individuals determine a share of the wage to reveal and the government has no 
instruments, other then increasing α, to squeeze higher z. Such instruments 
can be a frequent audit, high fines and penalties etc. In fact in Russia there are 
quite high penalties, but they can be easily reduced and overcome through 
bribes and collusion with dishonest bureaucrats. So we came to the necessity 
to solve a broader problem – to improve the environment in the whole economy. 
But this topic is beyond the scope of the paper. 
So far I can draw several conclusions: 
0 z(
)
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1. The funded system reduces the tax evasion better than PAYG. Besides, it 
doesn’t distort savings and labour-leisure decision of the individual. 
2. The outcome of the game between the government and the individuals is not 
Pareto-efficient until the share of the funded pillar is the only instrument 
used by the government to induce individuals to reveal their incomes. It 
holds as long as there exist the following conditions: 
− The pension reform is financed mainly from the inner source - the surplus 
of the revealed part of an income caused by the reform.  
− The scale of the reform is determined by the elective government. Because of 
its elective nature, the government puts higher weight on the costs of 
transition than on the long-run gains of the reform.  
− The marginal transition costs are increasing with the scale of reform 
because of the necessary institutional and economical arrangements and 
the obligation to provide the current pensioners.  
− The government has no tools, other than the very introduction of the funded 
pillar, to increase compliance. I.e. tools that can be used to constraint the 
utility level of the agent.  
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Chapter 3 
There are several important factors omitted in the previous discussion. 
One of them is a labour market. In Russia the major part of the social tax is 
paid by the employer, not by the worker.  Hence the labour market conditions 
affect the reform. The second factor is punishment. In the following chapter I 
consider the impact of punishment on the outcome of the reform. 
In the end, I discuss the path of the current pension reform in Russia. 
Labor market and uneven social tax distribution 
In Russia there is a high unemployment. It gives a power to employers in 
their bargaining with workers when they negotiate the terms of contracts. In 
addition, the high unemployment leads to a flexible employment policy to be 
the dominant one for enterprises. It’s very easy for a firm to find a workforce on 
the labour market. Thus the majority of enterprises don’t care about their 
workers. It implies that employers have no incentives to pay the high social 
taxes from the payroll in favour of the workers. It accelerates the hiding 
problem and reduces the inflow to the pension fund. 
It was discussed above that the introduction of the funded pillar 
increases tax compliance. 
But the bias of the power to the employer seriously undermines the effect 
of the reform.  
Let us turn to our model. To take into account the labour market 
situation I relax the assumption that it is the worker who pays the tax. Now it 
is the employer.  
The worker is the one who benefits from the increase in the share of 
funded system α. It is in his interest to increase a revealed share of income in 
response to the increased funded pillar. But it is the employer who pays the 
social taxes. The payroll basis of the taxes increases labour costs of a firm. As 
it was mentioned above, under the present conditions a firm doesn’t care about 
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its workforce. It doesn’t gain from the increased compliance or increased share 
of the funded pillar. At the same time, it bears the costs associated with the 
increased compliance. As a result, a firm has much weaker incentives to reveal 
wage than an employee. In reality the compliance ratio is the outcome of the 
bargaining of the employer and employee influenced by such aspects as an 
audit frequency, the conditions of punishment for the tax evasion. For the time 
being I neglect the punishment policy to concentrate the attention on the 
changes made only by the introduction of the labour market influence. The 
nature of the labour market provides the employer with a significant bargaining 
power. Hence in the case when a firm determines a revealed share it will be 
smaller than that of an individual. 
In terms of the model, it means that the individual response curve z(α) is 
steeper then the one in the original model. For the same share of the funded 
pillar, the larger part of the income is hidden. The shift is shown on the figure 
3.1. The more power has the employer the higher the slope of the curve. In the 
marginal case we may get a vertical line.  
Figure 3.1. Shift of the response curve caused by the labour marcet conditions. 
Thus the reduction in the tax evasion caused by the reform is smaller 
than expected. It is shown on the figure 3.2 that the outcome of the 
Stackelberg game shifts from the point A to B. 
z(α
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Figure 3.2. The result of shift in response curve on the outcome of the Stackelberg game.  
Further on I’ll mark the variables of the original model with subscript A 
and the variables of the model with the labour market conditions with the 
subscript B.  
The outcome (αB, zB) remains Pareto-inefficient since the shift doesn’t 
affect the reason of the inefficiency problem. 
In the new outcome the government became worse off than in the 
original one, i.e. SA>SB.  
Do the workers benefit from the shift? 
It depends on the concrete outcome of the reform, i.e. on the changes of 
both α and z.  
The introduction of labour market relations reduces the share of the 
revealed income zA>zB. So it undermines the influence of the reform on the tax 
compliance. The decreased share of the revealed outcome in the new outcome 
reduces pension benefits. It has a negative impact on the individual utility.  
The total effect on the utility depends on the dynamics of α. Remind that 
the higher the share of the funded pillar α the higher the return on the pension 
savings for the individual and thus the higher the individual utility.  
If the scale of the reform αB is less than the original one αA, the 
individual is worse off.  
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The individual is worse off even if αB is slightly higher than αA, but the 
corresponding increase of the individual utility is not enough to overweight the 
decrease of the utility caused by the decrease of pension payment because of 
decrease of z.  
The case of the reduction of the individual utility is illustrated on the 
figure 3.3.  
It is worth to note that the two response curves correspond to the 
different economic agents. The original one zA(α) is the response of the worker, 
while the shifted one zB(α) is the response of the employer. The employer 
doesn’t take into account the whole benefits of the reform for his worker, while 
bears the costs.  
The utility curve of the individual vA that passes through A corresponds 
to higher utility level then that of B (vB). It means that the unemployment, 
which weakens the worker’s bargaining power against his employer, makes him 
worse off.  
 In this case, both the government and workers are better off when 
worker determines the revealed part of the wage by himself.  
Figure 3.3. The reduction in the utility-levels of individuals. 
It is possible to get αB significantly higher than αA. The scale of the reform 
doesn’t directly affect the behaviour of the employer with respect to the tax 
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evasion. There is an indirect influence through the worker, which is weak in 
Russia under the present labour market conditions. It reduces the power of the 
government in the game. The government now has to set higher α than in the 
original case to get the same compliance.  
It may be the case that the increased share of the reform, and the 
consequent increase in the return on pension contributions, compensates the 
reduction of the individual utility caused by reduced z. 
This case is illustrated in the figure 3.4.  
1.1.2  
Figure 3.3. The increase in the utility-levels of individuals caused by higher scale of the reform. 
What measures can be suggested to reduce tax evasion problem?  
Beside the general recommendations about the improvement of the whole 
situation concerning the trust of population there is one more concrete advice: 
to reconstruct the social tax base.  
Current distribution of the pension tax between an employer and 
employee is 28% and 1% (for the social taxes it is 35,6% and 1%, 
correspondingly).  The high contribution rates create a large wedge between the 
cost of labour and the employees’ take-home pay. Together with the flexible 
employment policy and the low motivation of employer to pay the taxes, it 
encourages tax evasion and a growth of informal activities.  
0 zB(α)    
( )
z 
0 
V
B VB>
V
47 
 
One of the solutions is to redistribute a payment of the social taxes: 
increase the share of employee and decrease the share of employer. The 
current distribution is the heritage of the soviet welfare system. At that time 
the enterprises were responsible for the wellbeing of the workers, provided a 
social net and paid social taxes. It wasn’t a heavy burden for the enterprises 
because of the soft budget constraints.  
Let us take a look on the table 1.1 in the first chapter (“Pension and 
social tax rates, mid-1990”). There are distribution of taxes between an 
employer and worker for several countries. Many countries have more even 
distribution of the taxes. We can notice that in all the countries of the Former 
Soviet Union the tax distribution is similar to the Russian case. It also 
supports the above explanation about the inherited soviet tax system. 
A more even distribution of tax burden means that the employees, the 
ones who are interested in increasing compliance, pay the higher part of the 
taxes. It increases the revealed part of the income and shifts the response 
curve to the right.  
This shift is illustrated on the figure 3.4 
Figure 3.4. Effect of more even distribution. 
Point A is a Stackelberg equilibrium under uneven tax distribution, while 
B corresponds to more even distribution.  
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The revealed share is higher in the case of more even distribution zB(α) > 
zA(α). The government is better off as SB<SA.  
The employers benefit from the decrease in the social tax burden. 
But we can say nothing about change in utility of the worker since it 
depends on the change in the scale of the reform α. I’ve discussed it quite 
thoroughly above. Here I just mention one additional reason, which contributes 
to the reduction of the individual utility. Because of the weak bargaining power 
the individual is unlikely to get any compensation in terms of a higher wage 
from the entrprise.  
Punishment policy and tax evasion 
In the previous discussion I omit punishment, since the intention was to 
look on the “pure” relation between the size of the reform and the reduction of 
the tax evasion as a source of financing the reform.  
Let us now introduce the punishment opportunity to the model. It is 
important to emphases that the attention is devoted not to the punishment 
itself but to its impact on the reform. 
The punishment policy can be designed in a several ways: with a fixed 
penalty or the penalty that is linked to the hidden amount.  
Denote an expected penalty payment as Q. 
Let us first consider the simple form of the expected penalty payment   
Q=p((1-z)τw+F) (3.1) 
Where p is the probability to be caught. It doesn’t depend on the hidden 
part. The payment consists from a fixed penalty F and the hidden part of the 
contributions (1-z)τw. 
The individual maximization problem becomes:  
Max v(c1,t,c2,t+1)=U(c1,t)+(1+θ)-1 U(c2,t+1) (3.2) 
Subject to the budget constrains for the two periods: 
c1,t+st=wt-τzwt=(1-τz)wt-Q (3.3)  
c2,t+1=Rt+1st+(αRt+1 +(1-α)Gt+1) (τzwt+p(1-z)τwt) (3.4) 
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It is worth to note that under the punishment policy the discovered part 
of a hidden income is added to the pension contribution. Thus there is only one 
harm to the utility level of the individual – the fixed penalty F. 
The system of the first order conditions corresponding to the problem is 
(3.5), (3.6). 
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From the systems of the first order conditions we can obtain the effect of 
the scale of the reform on the revealed part of the income in the presence of 
punishment.  
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It is easy to check that the ratio is positive. 
Let us  compare the impact of the reform on the tax evasion in the two 
cases with and without punishment, i.e. (3.7) and (2.18). There are two 
differences: 
− In the numerator: term z+p(1-z) in (3.7) instead of z in (2.18).  
− In the denominator: term (1-p) appears in (3.7).  
Both differences make the ratio in (3.7) greater than (2.18). Hence the 
reduction in the tax evasion in response to the implementation of the funded 
pillar is larger in the presence of punishment. Let us emphases that it is not 
the introduction of punishment that increases the revealed part z, but it is the 
reconstruction in the presence of punishment. 
In terms of the graphical analysis it means that the individual response 
curve shifts to the right. The outcome of the game, revealed share z, is higher. 
It is worth to note that the punishment does not eliminate Pareto-ineficiency, 
since it affects the response curve without changing the reason of inefficiency – 
the lack of the government power to fix an individual utility level. The same 
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holds for a more even distribution of the tax burden, that was discussed 
earlier.  
Current reform in Russia. New pension system 
Let us turn to the analysis of the current pension reform in Russia. 
Although the necessity of the reform was widely accepted, the very 
reconstruction of the pension system was launched only in the beginning of 
2002.  
Of course, partial changes and preparations were made before. In 2000 
the informational infrastructure was created. It is built in accordance with the 
law 01.04.96 “Individual registering in the State Pension Insurance”. For every 
employee the database contains information about  
− The period of working 
− The wage 
− The contributions paid  
− The invested part of contributions and investment income on it. The part 
corresponds to the funded pillar.  
− The period of working in the harmful conditions, that gives right for the 
privileged or additional pension.  
The law determining new pension system passed in December 2001.  
Since the beginning of 2002 the current PAYG is reconstructed to a new 
pension system. 
The social tax rate and its distribution remain the same: 28% is paid by 
an employer and 1% by an employee. Thus the current reform neglects a 
potential source to increase the tax compliance through the increase of the 
share paid by an employee, who is more interested in the increasing 
contributions than the employer. The latter perceives contributions mainly as 
costs, since they don’t bring any reward in the future.  
In the new system ½ of the contributions (14% of payroll) is collected by 
the state budget and is used for a basic part of the pension payment. The basic 
51 
 
part is equal for everybody. In fact, it means that the half of the pension system 
remains PAYG (Dutch type). 
The other half of the contributions is collected by the Pension fund. 
Depending on the age of the contributor 2-6% of the payroll (6% for those who 
are under 35, 2% for the year range 35-50) is invested until the retirement 
period and then paid together with the investment income. It corresponds to 
the funded pillar. 
The rest (8-12%) is taken into account when determine the pension 
payment. This part is distributed to the current recipients. Thus this part is 
organised as the German type of PAYG. 
The pension benefit consists from three parts that correspond to the 
three pillars:  
1. The basic part. It corresponds to the PAYG pillar (Dutch type). The eligibility 
to the part is determined by the 5-year working period. Its size is quite small 
and is linked to the minimum living standard. It’s equal for all recipients.  
2. The accumulated part. It corresponds to the PAYG pillar (German type). The 
part takes into account ½ of contributions. 
3. The accumulated and invested part that corresponds to the funded pillar. 
The part consists from the invested part of contributions and the investment 
income on it. 
In terms of our model the government has chosen α from 0,07 to 0,21 for 
different agents in the transition period with 0,21 further for everybody. 
In fact, the reform is quite moderate, especially if we take into account 
that the half of the pension system remained unchanged. The small share 
illustrates an anticipation of the government that the individual response curve 
is steep. 
The moderate scale of the reform implies a quite small revealed surplus.  
The situation corresponds to the one described by the model. 
Although the reform doesn’t use the possibility to get finance through the 
increase in the compliance in a full manner, it uses another one that wasn’t 
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described in the model. The new pension system creates incentives to increase 
a working period. The longer active period increases contributions and 
decreases survival after retirement. Both parameters are taken into account by 
the new pension system when determining the parts of the pension benefits 
that correspond to the funded and the German-type pillars, which are the 
largest parts of pension. It is worth to note that the direct increase of the 
pension age would be very unpopular. 
Longer active period implies increase in the contributions and decrease 
in the dependency ratio. Thus it contributes to improvement of the solvency of 
the whole pension system.  
Besides, in contrast with the previous system, a working pensioner has 
got a right to get pension benefits. Earlier he had a right either for salary or for 
pension.  
 New pension principle is implemented only for workers who is younger 
than 40. It makes the reform fairer, since it eases the double burden on the 
current generations and spreads the costs of reconstruction over time.  
In the end I mention one quite serious but, hopefully, temporary flaw of 
the new pension reform. It is the absence of the law that regulates the 
investment of pension money. It builds a certain risk for the contributors and 
undermines the reduction of the tax evasion, caused by the reconstruction of 
the pension system.    
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Conclusions 
There are several advantages of the Funded system in comparison with 
PAYG that made it very attractive in the present conditions of ageing of the 
population. They are a higher return on the contributions, more active capital 
markets, an increase in savings and investment (although there is a lot of 
discussion about it). 
The flaws in the design of Russian pension system inherited from the 
USSR worsen the performance of the pension provision especially in the 
difficult transition period. 
The reform was urgent since Russian pension system faces a very serious 
solvency problem. The demographic crisis, the weak compliance and the tax 
evasion reduce the contribution inflow, while loose eligibility rights and a lot of 
privilege beneficiaries increase the outflow.  
It was decided to introduce a multipillar system. The introduction of the 
funded pillar was stipulated by its following advantages:  
− A closer perceived link between contributions and benefits.  
− A higher return on contributions. 
− No distortions of the labour supply. 
The reconstruction contributes to the increase in tax compliance and 
restores the solvency of the pension system. It is especially important in the 
conditions of the scarcity of the other sources of financing of the reform (e.g. a 
state debt, a reduction of the benefits, or an increase of the social tax rate). 
The analysis proves the hypothesis that the introduction of the funded 
pillar reduces tax evasion.  
However, as long as the scale of the reform is determined through the 
interaction between the self-interest elective government and individuals, the 
outcome of the reform is not Pareto-efficient. In the paper the interaction is 
analysed by means of Stackelberg game. The inefficiency of the outcome means 
that the scale of the reform (or, alternatively, the size of the funded pillar) and 
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the revealed part are not as high as they could be. Thus the reform doesn’t 
reach one of its main goals – the increase tax compliance. It seriously 
undermines the ability of the new pension system to give a sufficient provision 
to the elderly. There are several conditions in Russia, which stipulate the 
inefficient outcome. They supplement each other: 
1. The surplus of the revealed part of income caused by the reform is a main 
source for financing of the reconstruction of the pension system. External 
sources are limited by the debt-burden budget. An increase of the social tax 
rates is limited by their high level and its negative effect on the tax 
compliance. A contraction of eligibility rules as a source has been already 
exhausted. A further reduction of the benefits is not possible because of 
their low level.  
2. Because of the necessary institutional and economical arrangements and 
the obligations to provide current pensioners the costs of the reconstruction 
are increasing with the scale of the reform. Gradually, the corresponding 
surplus becomes insufficient to cover the costs.  
3. The scale of the reform is determined by an elective government. Because of 
the self-interests to retain the power, the government puts higher weight on 
current costs of the transition than on the long-run gains of the reform. The 
possible reason can be inability of the government to persuade citizens in 
the necessity to tighten living conditions in the short-run for the better 
pension provision afterwards. The situation is especially peculiar for Russia, 
where there is a lack of trust of the population to such kind of promises. 
4. The government has no other tools (in addition to the very introduction of 
the funded pillar) to elicit an increase in compliance. I.e. the tools to 
constraint utility level of agent. The change in the power structure in favour 
of the government can eliminate Pareto-inefficiency.  
It is worth to note that such a change in power structure can be 
unfavourable for individuals. Because if government can fix/constraint their 
utility levels, it may have a power to reduce the utility further down and made 
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individuals worse off. So even though the outcome is Pareto-inefficient it can be 
more favourable for individuals to have some inefficiency with the freedom, 
rather than to be squeezed by the self-interest government in the Pareto-
efficient way.  
The paper considers such instruments as a stricter punishment for tax 
evasion or a more even distribution of the social tax among employees and 
employers. These instruments reduce the tax evasion and increase the scale of 
reform. But still, they do not eliminate Pareto-inefficiency.  
The result of our theoretical model corresponds to the way the current 
reform in Russia goes. The reform has a moderate scale. Thus it is likely result 
in small reduction of the tax evasion. 
In the end I’d like to note that the major concern of the work is to give a 
description and a possible explanation of the slow progress of the current 
pension reform in Russia, rather than to give some recommendation on how to 
improve the situation. It stipulated a positive character of the paper, although I 
consider some policy measures.  
 
 
56 
 
References 
1. Palacios, R. and Pallares-Miralles, M. (2000): International Patterns of Pension Provision, 
World Bank report, April 2000.  
2. Homburg, S. (1997): Old-Age Pension Systems: A Theoretical Evaluation. From Herbert 
Giersch. Reforming the Welfare State.233-245. Berlin: Springer. 
3. Brunner, J.K. (1996): Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system: The 
case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness, Journal of Public Economics 60. 
131-146. 
4. Gøsta Espring-Andersen (1990): The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.  
5. John B. Williamson (2001): Privatizing public pension systems. Lessons from Latin 
America. Journal of Aging Studies 15. 285-302. 
6. Becker Ch. M., Paltsev S. (2001): Pension Burdens and Reform in Transitional Economies: 
Lessons from the Kyrgyz Republic.  
7. Marta de Castello Branco (1998): Pension Reform in the Baltic, Russian, and other Countries 
of the Former Soviet Union, IMF Working Paper, February 1998.  
8. The Overlapping Generations Model (1989), from Blanchard, O.,J., Fischer, S.: Lectures on 
Macroeconomics. Chapter 3. 91-153. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
9. Schimmelpfenning, Axel (2000): Pension Reform, Private Saving and the Current Account in 
a Small Open Economy, IMF Working Paper, October 2000. 
10. Kortikoff, Laurence J. (1996): Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in General 
Equilibrium. NBER Woking paper No.5776.    
11. Hassler J., Lindberck A. (1997): Optimal actuarial fairness in pension systems. Economic 
Letters 55. 251-255. 
12. Cremer H., Pestieau P. (2000): Reforming our pension system: Is it a demographic, financial 
or political problem? European Economic Review 44. 974-983. 
13. Hemming R. (1998): Should Public Pensions be Funded? IMF Working paper 98/35.  
14. Mackezie G.A., Gerson P., Cuevas A. (1997): Can Public Pension Reform Increase 
Saving? Finance & Development, December 1997.46-49. 
